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 Introduction 
 The conceptual history of schizophrenia is marked by 
considerable dissent about its nosological status, and the 
question of whether it represents a distinct disease entity 
remains hotly debated  [1–4] . Another recurring feature 
in the conceptual history of schizophrenia is the reference 
to concepts of self and person, and it often seems to be 
unquestioned that “schizophrenia and other psychotic 
disorders are… essentially related to self-disturbances” 
 [5] (p. 784). More specifically, self-disturbances are held 
to be a core feature of schizophrenia’s phenomenology 
 [6–9] . Operationalized as thought insertion, thought 
withdrawal, and thought broadcasting, they figure among 
the so-called first-rank symptoms of Kurt Schneider  [9] 
and still serve as diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia in 
ICD-10  [10] . Since the early 2000s, a rise in collaboration 
between philosophical and empirical inquiries into the 
self can be observed  [11] , and specific neurobiological  [5, 
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12] and neurocognitive  [13, 14] correlates of self-distur-
bances in schizophrenia have been suggested. Also, ther-
apists from diverse theoretical backgrounds have at-
tempted to address alterations of self-experience in psy-
chotherapy  [15–19] . Despite this widespread interest and 
the apparently unanimous agreement about the essential 
role of self-disturbances in schizophrenia, there is consid-
erable conceptual diversity  [11, 20] , i.e., what is meant by 
“self” varies greatly.
 Thus, if one considers the self, and schizophrenia as 
well, as primarily theoretical concepts – and, it seems, 
rather elusive ones – the question of why and how these 
two concepts came to be associated becomes pressing. In 
other words, why and for what purpose was the concept 
of self invoked in conceptualizations of schizophrenia? 
Hoping to illuminate these questions, this paper stages a 
fictitious dialogue 1 between Eugen Bleuler (1857–1939) 2 , 
the inventor of schizophrenia, and Arthur Kronfeld 
(1886–1941) 3 , psychiatric practitioner, theorist, and fer-
vent critic. Proceeding from the close reading of Bleuler’s 
and Kronfeld’s central texts on schizophrenia with a spe-
cial view of how concepts of self and related concepts like 
person figure therein, this paper provides an exemplary 
historical and conceptual analysis mapping the develop-
ment of the conceptual alliance of schizophrenia and self 
that we still observe today. Bleuler as its inventor is an 
obvious choice in this investigation into the conceptual 
history of schizophrenia; his less-known contemporary 
Kronfeld is a suitable interlocutor with regard to the ques-
tion of our paper because he is an early proponent of a 
prominent role for the self in conceptions of schizophre-
nia and because his work shows a particularly high level 
of conceptual awareness. The findings are contextualized 
in light of present-day nosological debates.
 Eugen Bleuler and Arthur Kronfeld: A Fictitious 
Dialogue 
 Eugen Bleuler’s Schizophrenia 
 Bleuler accepted the disease entity that Kraepelin had 
described as Dementia praecox, but he disagreed with 
the ideas of early onset and poor outcome implied in the 
name. Thus, besides renaming the disease, he rejected 
course and outcome as dominant nosological principles. 
This made him turn to the realm of psychology “to search 
behind the general manifestations for what is specifical-
ly schizophrenic”  [21] (p. 453). What he found in his 
clinical and experimental observations was the distur-
bance of the associations ( Assoziationsstörung ). This dis-
turbance, Bleuler claimed, was present in all cases of 
schizophrenia and was thus one of its basic symptoms 
( Grundsymptom ). Holding it to be directly related to the 
presumed underlying physical disease process, he also 
considered it a primary symptom ( Primärsymptom )  [21] 
(pp. 454–457) [on the principles of Bleuler’s nosology, 
see  25, 26 ]. The special status of the disturbance of the 
associations as both basic and primary symptom justi-
fies considering it schizophrenia’s core disturbance on 
Bleuler’s account of the disease. While Bleuler highlights 
this special status, he does not employ the term core dis-
turbance. 
 In contrast to the disturbance of the associations, dis-
turbances related to the self, the person or personality – 
terms that Bleuler seems to use interchangeably – only 
figure under accessory symptoms. This means that Bleu-
ler does not consider them essential for the diagnosis; in 
other words, he does not think of them as involved in the 
core disturbance. As he explains in a short paragraph en-
titled “The Person”:
 The patients know who they are, unless delusional ideas falsify 
the person. Yet the I is never quite intact; it regularly shows a ten-
dency to splits. But in the simpler cases, these disturbances are not 
marked enough to be easily described. They will therefore be further 
characterized under the rubric of accessory symptoms  [27] (p. 58).
 1 It is unknown whether Eugen Bleuler and Arthur Kronfeld ever met. 
They exchanged letters in which they discussed materialism and the role of 
philosophy in psychiatry, yet, in these letters at least, they did not discuss the 
topics considered in this paper (Bleuler and Kronfeld, unpubl. letters, 1924; 
Archive of the Psychiatric Hospital, University of Zurich). 
 2 Eugen Bleuler was born and raised in the village of Zollikon near Zurich, 
Switzerland. After graduating in medicine, he started his residential training 
in psychiatry at the Waldau Hospital in Bern. Study trips took him to Paris 
to work with Jean-Martin Charcot, to Munich where he trained under Bern-
hard von Gudden, and to London. He completed his residential training at 
the University Hospital of Psychiatry in Zurich, known as “Burghölzli,” and 
was appointed director of the mental asylum of Rheinau in 1886. After liv-
ing with and caring for long-term psychiatric patients in Rheinau for more 
than 12 years, he returned to Zurich as professor of psychiatry at Burghölzli 
in 1898 and held this position until his retirement in 1927. His most long-
lasting contribution to psychiatry is the introduction of “schizophrenia” in 
1908  [21] .
3 Arthur Kronfeld was born in Berlin, Germany, in 1886. After graduating 
in medicine, he started his residential training in psychiatry in Heidelberg 
where he met Karl Jaspers. Besides his doctorate in medicine (Heidelberg, 
1909), he gained a doctorate in philosophy (Berlin, 1912) and had a life-long 
friendship with the neo-Kantian philosopher Leonard Nelson. From 1919, 
he worked at the Berlin Institute of Sexual Medicine and became professor 
at Charité in 1931. Due to his Jewish descent, he went into exile in Switzer-
land and then Russia in 1935. At the approach of the German troops, he 
committed suicide in Moscow in 1941. His most important works are  Die 
Psychologie in der Psychiatrie (Psychology in Psychiatry)  [22] ,  Das Wesen der 
psychiatrischen Erkenntnis (The Nature of Psychiatric Knowledge)  [23] , and 
 Perspektiven der Seelenheilkunde (Perspectives in Psychiatry)  [24] , which, to 
the best of our knowledge, have not been translated into English. All transla-
tions are by the first author. 
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 Bleuler continues to use “person,” “personality,” “I,” 
and “self” side by side, e.g., he describes the “inner effort” 
a patient has to make in order to “find her own I for a 
short while” and that the patients have “lost their indi-
vidual self”  [27] (p. 117). One learns that the healthy I is 
linked to a feeling of activity and that it directs the thoughts 
 [27] , yet no definition of the I or of the other concepts is 
given. Rather, Bleuler presents a collection of phenomena 
that figure prominently in recent psychopathological ac-
counts of self-disorders  [28, 29] , e.g., transitivism, an al-
tered awareness of one’s body, thought insertion, and loss 
of one’s “boundaries in space and time”  [27] . While these 
phenomena of inner experience are mostly attributed to 
alterations of the I or the person, changes in or particu-
larities of outward behavior, e.g., a tendency toward re-
proachfulness in someone who was formerly an agreeable 
person, are mostly attributed to alterations of personality. 
The term person is also used in relation to biographical 
identity 4 . With all concepts, metaphors of disintegration 
and splitting are used to describe the alterations observed 
in schizophrenia. While it seems possible on this account 
to see the I as the origin of associative activity and thereby 
consider its disturbances at the heart of schizophrenia un-
derstood as a disturbance of the associations, Bleuler 
himself does not establish this link. Alterations of the I, 
the personality, the person, and the self remain among 
accessory symptoms, and Bleuler does not assign them an 
essential role in defining schizophrenia as a distinct no-
sological entity. 
 Arthur Kronfeld’s Criticism and Alternative  
 Kronfeld was primarily concerned with the question 
of how “a general psychiatry as science is possible”  [23] 
(p. 7). His aim was not to borrow methods and principles 
from neighboring sciences but to establish a specifically 
psychiatric epistemology and scientific practice. This is 
what he called an “autologous” psychiatry  [23] (p. 8)  [30] . 
Starting from the premise that “the clinical practice of 
psychiatry is psychologically grounded”, he held that “all 
questions regarding the constitution of mental processes 
can only be answered by knowing the inner structure of 
the latter”  [23] (pp. 113–114). A nosological entity like 
schizophrenia, in Kronfeld’s view, can therefore only be 
based on a psychological core disturbance. The latter is 
gained by “formal reduction of the symptoms’ structures” 
and “in its essence cannot be psychologically deduced” 
 [24] (p. 339).
 Kronfeld thus sympathizes with Bleuler’s general ap-
proach when he outlines “the problem of schizophrenia” 
 [24] (p. 324) with the aim of establishing “its inner unity” 
(ibid.). Yet he criticizes Bleuler’s disturbance of the asso-
ciations for not qualifying as a core disturbance: firstly, he 
holds that the disturbance of the associations is not spe-
cific to schizophrenia but rather “the mark of mental ill-
ness in general”  [24] (p. 347). Secondly, he argues that 
Bleuler’s psychoanalytic interpretation of schizophrenia 
disregards the principle that a core disturbance cannot be 
psychologically deduced. Bleuler quite clearly rebuts the 
second criticism by distinguishing between the psycho-
dynamic interpretability of secondary symptoms on the 
one hand and the impossibility to interpret why someone 
suffers from primary symptoms on the other hand  [23, 
31] . The first criticism, however, is more difficult to refute 
on Bleuler’s account. While disorders of the associations 
do not figure prominently in his accounts of other mental 
illnesses  [32] , the association experiments he carried out 
with Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) at the Burghölzli 
Hospital showed alterations of the associations as a gen-
eral reaction to complex stimulation that can be found in 
healthy people  [33] as well as in hysteria  [34] , epilepsy, 
“idiocy”  [33], and schizophrenia  [27] (pp. 29–31). The 
specificity to schizophrenia seems to be at most quantita-
tive  [27] (p. 31). Granted that despite these shortcomings 
the disturbance of the associations holds considerate ex-
planatory power with regard to schizophrenic symptoms, 
Kronfeld’s main criticism is that “the advantages are 
gained at the cost of the unity of the person that has to be 
sacrificed”  [24] (p. 350). In other words, Kronfeld under-
stands Bleuler’s disturbance of the associations as a de-
struction of the unity of the person. This is where he fun-
damentally disagrees, for the person, on his account, is an 
inseparable whole  [23] (pp. 341–343),  [24] (pp. 351–352). 
Bleuler’s description of its disintegration or splitting thus 
appears untenable. Kronfeld therefore argues that a core 
disturbance can only grant the unity of the primary symp-
toms, i.e., the unity of schizophrenia, “by being itself 
nothing else than the unity of the person of the schizo-
phrenic”  [24] (p. 359).
 Before attempting to gain an understanding of this 
somewhat cryptic formulation, let us summarize briefly 
where we stand with regard to the initial question of this 
paper: the prominent role of the “person” in Kronfeld’s 
conception of schizophrenia stems from his intention to 
guarantee schizophrenia’s status as a distinct and unified 
nosological entity. Such a status is challenged, according 
to his criticism of Bleuler’s account, by attempts at psy-
chological deduction, i.e., complete psychodynamic ex-
4 For a detailed analysis of Bleuler’s use of these terms, see also “Bleuler’s 
idea of schizophrenia,” an article in preparation by Stephenson et al.
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planation, by the difficulty to identify a core disturbance 
that is truly specific as well as by the threat of disregarding 
fundamental features of what it means to be human.
 But (how) can Kronfeld’s concept of the disturbance 
that  is the unity of the person meet these exigencies of a 
schizophrenic core disturbance? He explains:
 Through intentional orientation, in all its experiences and acts, 
the subject gains selfhood, i.e., the awareness of its self-identical, 
persisting subjectivity. This implies awareness of all that belongs 
to this subjectivity and that demarcates it from the sphere of ob-
jects. All intentionality on the other hand is but a function of this 
personal selfhood in its interaction with the sphere of objects and 
with itself. When there are primary disturbances of intentionality, 
this selfhood risks breaking down  [24] (p. 359).
 One first has to disentangle different terms and it has 
to be noted that, while conceptually far more developed, 
Kronfeld’s terminology is probably as imprecise as Bleul-
er’s: the fact of being a conscious human being seems to 
be described by “subject,” and “selfhood” seems to be 
identical to “person.” “Person” is also equated with “I” 
 [24] (p. 357). Secondly, the concept of intentionality 
needs to be introduced: this is less ambiguous as Kronfeld 
explicitly refers to Edmund Husserl’s (1859–1938) work 
understanding intentionality as the directedness of con-
sciousness, i.e., as the fact that consciousness is always 
consciousness of something  [35] . He also takes up Hus-
serl’s thought of the self-directedness or autoreferential-
ity of consciousness  [36] (p. 323) when he writes that self-
hood emerges in a subject’s intentional experiences and 
acts. In other words, Kronfeld, in accordance with Hus-
serl, holds self-consciousness to be implied in any act of 
consciousness because of consciousness’ intentional na-
ture. This self-consciousness is what he understands by 
“selfhood” or “person.” As this “person” is dynamically 
constituted by intentional acts, he can claim that when 
intentionality is altered the person is equally altered but, 
so to speak, from within, leaving its unity intact  [24] (p. 
355). When he says that the “unity of the person of the 
schizophrenic” is schizophrenia’s core disturbance, this 
can thus be read to mean that the whole person of the 
schizophrenic is altered and that this whole-person al-
teration  is  schizophrenia’s core disturbance.
 Yet what about the statement that “this selfhood risks 
breaking down” “when there are primary disturbances of 
intentionality”? Does Kronfeld not fall back into Bleuler’s 
concept of disintegration, split, or loss of unity, i.e., the 
very concept he set out to overcome because it is irrecon-
cilable with his understanding of person? Also, if the 
breakdown of selfhood is caused by a disturbance of in-
tentionality, is not the latter the core disturbance of 
schizophrenia rather than the disturbance of the person? 
It is thus questionable whether Kronfeld is successful in 
preserving the unity of the person while holding its dis-
turbance to be schizophrenia’s essential and defining 
core. Yet he has to be credited not only with further de-
veloping the concept of self/person but also with prob-
lematizing the very notion of self-disturbance by drawing 
attention to possible conflicts with the concept of self it-
self, especially the assumption of its fundamental unity. 
 Discussion 
 Findings from Bleuler’s and Kronfeld’s Fictitious 
Dialogue 
 In present-day psychiatry, the conceptual alliance of 
schizophrenia and self (-disturbance) is often taken for 
granted to the extent that some authors have called it 
“tautological”  [37] . Yet, as our fictitious dialogue between 
Bleuler and Kronfeld exemplarily shows, this has not al-
ways been the case. Bleuler explicitly degraded phenom-
ena that are nowadays considered self-disturbances from 
any essential, defining status in his conception of schizo-
phrenia, regarding them only as accessory symptoms. He 
might have lacked the conceptual resources to capture 
these subtle alterations of experience  [27] (p. 58)  [6] (p. 
1123), but he who was openly skeptical about any philo-
sophical influence on psychiatry  [38] might equally have 
considered concepts of self and person too speculative to 
warrant any more prominent status. Kronfeld, on the 
contrary, purposefully borrowed concepts from philoso-
phy and invoked “self” and “person” to ground the status 
of schizophrenia as a distinct nosological entity  [24] (p. 
324). This status was a central concern to both authors.
 In the following paragraphs, the challenges to the uni-
ty of schizophrenia identified by Kronfeld will be dis-
cussed in light of present-day debates about the nosolog-
ical status of schizophrenia and research on the self and 
its disturbances.
 Demarcation from Other Mental Illnesses 
 A first challenge that Kronfeld identifies is the need to 
demarcate schizophrenia from other mental illnesses. 
This is the function a core disturbance has to fulfil on his 
account. Bleuler’s disturbance of the associations does 
not fulfil this requirement or at most allows a quantitative 
distinction from other mental illnesses as well as from 
mental health  [27, 33, 34] (pp. 29–31). Following Kron-
feld, the view that self-disturbances are specific to schizo-
phrenia and therefore represent a valid core disturbance 
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gained traction. It was made particularly prominent by 
Kurt Schneider’s (1887–1967) introduction of the first-
rank symptoms that include self-disturbances  [9, 39] . 
More recently again, authors whose interest lies in inves-
tigating the “clinical core” of schizophrenia  [6] have pro-
posed a nuanced account of subtle alterations of self-ex-
perience as specific to the schizophrenia spectrum  [7, 8] . 
Empirical studies have shown that these subtle alterations 
of self-experience discriminate, e.g., between schizophre-
nia, schizotypy, and other mental disorders  [40] as well as 
between persons at “ultra-high risk” of developing psy-
chosis and healthy controls  [41] . At the same time, Schnei-
derian first-rank symptoms have been deemphasized in 
the latest revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual DSM  [42]  for they “have not been found to have diag-
nostic specificity”  [43] , while a major review showed high 
specificity, yet low sensitivity, of first-rank symptoms 
 [44] . In part, these conflicting views on the status and 
specificity of first-rank symptoms and of self-disorders in 
particular might stem from differences between Anglo-
American and German traditions in psychopathology. 
But perhaps these conflicting views also point to the more 
pertinent difficulty of establishing  the specific core dis-
turbance of schizophrenia, and one should therefore con-
tent oneself with studying  a fundamental disturbance 
conceding that there may be others  [45] (p. 15). First-
rank symptoms and self-disturbances might then still 
serve as a useful clinical tool  [46] yet without bearing the 
burden of being schizophrenia’s specific core. Beyond the 
debate on what qualifies as an adequately specific schizo-
phrenic core disturbance, the view of schizophrenia as a 
unitary nosological category as such is nowadays increas-
ingly called into question: e.g., it has so far not been pos-
sible to identify a common factor structure of schizophre-
nia symptoms  [47] . Furthermore, there is a rising aware-
ness of important communalities between schizophrenia 
and other conditions like bipolar disorder  [48] . Both 
findings oppose the idea of there being one specific core 
disturbance and suggest giving up the idea of schizophre-
nia as a distinct nosological category in favor of a trans-
diagnostic approach  [49–51] .
 Demarcation from Mental Health 
 The second challenge identified by Kronfeld is the de-
marcation of illness from health. He argues that if schizo-
phrenic symptoms can be explained by the same psy-
chological mechanisms – association, dissociation, and 
principles borrowed from psychoanalysis according to 
Bleuler – as the experience of mentally healthy persons, 
schizophrenia’s status as an illness is lost. In Bleuler’s 
and Kronfeld’s times, the worry of blurring the line be-
tween schizophrenia and mental health was particularly 
discussed in relation to Ernst Kretschmer’s (1888–
1964) concept of “schizothymic personality,” by which 
Kretschmer understood a variant of “normal” personality 
on a continuum with schizophrenia  [52] . Since then, 
much research has shown that weak expressions of psy-
chotic phenomena are common in the general population 
and that they occur across diagnostic categories  [53] . Also 
specifically with regards to self-disturbances, it has been 
demonstrated that they are relatively frequent in the gen-
eral population without, in many cases, causing signifi-
cant distress  [49] . This casts doubt on their capacity to 
clearly distinguish between “normal” psychology and 
psychopathology. But is this necessarily a bad thing? As 
van Os  [54] (p. 305) argues: “A 21st century concept of 
psychotic disorder should refer to an experience that can 
be understood as a variation of normal human menta-
tion… (or as) an aspect of human mentation and experi-
ence that is universal.” Bleuler’s conception of schizo-
phrenia appears more modern in this respect than Kron-
feld’s: Clearly he assumes an organic disease process that 
demarcates schizophrenia from a state of mental health, 
yet, stressing the meaningfulness and understandability 
of the schizophrenic experience  [55] , he smoothens the 
categorical gap between schizophrenia and mental health.
 Fundamental Features of Human Nature and the 
Unity of the Self 
 This takes us to the third challenge identified by Kron-
feld, namely the risk of disregarding fundamental fea-
tures of what it means to be human when devising a 
schizophrenic core disturbance. Kronfeld argues that the 
person cannot lose its unity, that it cannot split or dissoci-
ate. But until the present day, concepts of self and person 
and their disturbances remain unclear, or diverse, in this 
respect. Some talk about a self that can be divided into 
(measurable) subcomponents and hold that in schizo-
phrenia these subcomponents appear disjointed due to a 
weakening in binding  [56] . Others talk about a “minimal 
self”  [57] that is always implicitly given in consciousness, 
simple and indivisible. Not unlike Kronfeld, proponents 
of this latter view maintain that schizophrenia is charac-
terized by self-disturbances, but that the “minimal self” is 
preserved  [58, 59] . The unity of the self is thus still de-
bated today. To better understand the nature of these de-
bates, it might be helpful to consider them in light of neo-
Kantianism, in particular the Fries-Nelson school to 
which Kronfeld explicitly adhered. Whereas Kant himself 
postulated that apriorical elements, e.g., categories, are 
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necessarily at work  before any empirical research can be 
conducted, neo-Kantians like Leonard Nelson held that 
the Kantian categories, while still considered transcen-
dental, may also be investigated empirically. The result-
ing tension between different understandings of the term 
“transcendental” can still be seen in present-day psycho-
pathological debates  [60] , e.g., with regard to terms like 
“minimal self”  [57] or “transcendental depersonaliza-
tion”  [61] (p. 243).
 One might be tempted to consider these disputes mere 
armchair philosophy, but insofar as they contribute to 
our understanding of schizophrenia and more broadly to 
our understanding of our fellow human being they have 
important nosological, clinical, and ethical implications. 
 The Conceptual Alliance of Schizophrenia and Self 
Reconsidered 
 Bleuler regarded self-disturbances as just one psycho-
pathological feature of schizophrenia among many oth-
ers. As exemplarily shown by Kronfeld’s criticism and al-
ternative account, they only gained a special status in the 
context of the struggle to ground schizophrenia’s status 
as a distinct and unified nosological category. The con-
ceptual alliance of schizophrenia and self thus depends on 
the nosological framework.
 Against the background of currently debated changes 
to the established nosological framework – especially the 
waning tradition of core disturbance  [6] , the trend to-
wards denosologisation  [4, 62, 63] and transdiagnostic 
thinking  [4, 49–51] – it remains to be seen how schizo-
phrenia, the self, and their entrenched conceptual alliance 
will fare.
 Conclusions 
 Considered across the over 100-year-long history of 
schizophrenia, the conceptual alliance of schizophrenia 
and self (-disturbances) appears not as a logical necessity 
or as an unchangeable given but rather as contingent on 
the nosological framework as well as possibly on broader 
sociocultural trends. This brings to the fore the concep-
tual character of both the self and schizophrenia and cau-
tions not to reify either  [3] . However, if one considers 
schizophrenia and self as heuristic concepts, they can be 
helpful in structuring the multitude of phenomena we ex-
perience and observe, in communicating about them, and 
in studying them in more depth empirically – not only in 
schizophrenia but also across mental disorders as well as 
in mental health.
 Disclosure Statement 
 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interests in 
connection with this article.
 
 References 
 1 Allardyce J, Gaebel W, Zielasek J, van Os J: 
Deconstructing Psychosis conference Febru-
ary 2006: the validity of schizophrenia and al-
ternative approaches to the classification of 
psychosis. Schizopfr Bull 2007; 33: 863–867.  
 2 Gaebel W, Zielasek J: The DSM-V initiative 
“deconstructing psychosis” in the context of 
Kraepelin’s concept on nosology. Eur Arch 
Psychiatry Clin Neurosci 2008; 258(suppl 2):
41–47. 
 3 Van Os J: “Schizophrenia” does not exist. BMJ 
2016; 352: 375. 
 4 Van Os J: The transdiagnostic dimension of 
psychosis: implications for psychiatric nosol-
ogy and research. Shanghai Arch Psychiatry 
2015; 27: 82–86.  
 5 Ebisch SJH, Aleman A: The fragmented self: 
imbalance between intrinsic and extrinsic 
self-networks in psychotic disorders. Lancet 
Psychiatry 2016; 3: 784–790. 
 6 Parnas J: A disappearing heritage: the clinical 
core of schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull 2011; 
 37: 1121–1130. 
 7 Sass LA: Self-disturbance and schizophrenia: 
structure, specificity, pathogenesis (current 
issues, new directions). Schizophr Res 2014; 
 152: 5–11. 
 8 Sass LA, Parnas J: Schizophrenia, conscious-
ness, and the self. Schizopfr Bull 2003; 29: 427–
444. 
 9 Schneider K: Klinische Psychopathologie, ed 
15. Stuttgart, Thieme, 1943. 
 10 World Health Organization: International 
Classification of Diseases, ed 10. Geneva, 
WHO, 1990. 
 11 Gallagher S: Philosophical conceptions of the 
self: implications for cognitive science. Trends 
Cogn Sci 2000; 4: 14–21. 
 12 Mishara A, Bonoldi I, Allen P, Rutigliano G, 
Perez J, Fusar-Poli P, McGuire P: Neurobio-
logical models of self-disorders in early 
schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull 2016; 42: 874–
880. 
 13 Nelson B, Whitford TJ, Lavoie S, Sass LA: 
What are the neurocognitive correlates of 
basic self-disturbance in schizophrenia? Inte-
grating phenomenology and neurocognition. 
1. Source monitoring deficits. Schizophr Res 
2014; 152: 12–19. 
 14 Nelson B, Whitford TJ, Lavoie S, Sass LA: 
What are the neurocognitive correlates of ba-
sic self-disturbance in schizophrenia? Inte-
grating phenomenology and neurocognition. 
2. Aberrant salience. Schizophr Res 2014; 152: 
 20–27. 
 15 Hillis JD, Leonhardt BL, Vohs JL, Buck KD, 
Salvatore G, Popolo R, Dimaggio G, Lysaker 
PH: Metacognitive reflective and insight ther-
apy for people in early phase of a schizophre-
nia spectrum disorder. J Clin Psychol 2015; 71: 
 125–135. 
 16 Nelson B, Sass LA: Medusa’s stare: a case 
study of working with self-disturbance in the 
early phase of schizophrenia. Clin Case Stud 
2009; 8: 489–504. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
: 
Un
ive
rs
itä
t Z
ür
ich
,  
E-
M
ed
ie
n 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
13
0.
60
.4
7.
17
8 
- 1
1/
1/
20
19
 1
1:
47
:5
5 
AM
 Schizophrenia, Self, and Person Psychopathology 2017;50:297–303
DOI: 10.1159/000479071
303
 17 Ng R, Fish S, Granholm E: Insight and theory 
of mind in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res 
2015; 225: 169–174. 
 18 Skodlar B, Henriksen MG, Sass LA, Nelson B, 
Parnas J: Cognitive-behavioral therapy for 
schizophrenia: a critical evaluation of its theo-
retical framework from a clinical-phenome-
nological perspective. Psychopathology 2013; 
 46: 249–265. 
 19 Stanghellini G, Lysaker PH: The psychother-
apy of schizophrenia through the lens of phe-
nomenology: intersubjectivity and the search 
for the recovery of first- and second-person 
awareness. Am J Psychother 2007: 61: 163–
179. 
 20 Lysaker PH, Lysaker JT: Schizophrenia and 
alterations in self-experience: a comparison of 
6 perspectives. Schizophr Bull 2010; 36: 331–
340. 
 21 Bleuler E: Die Prognose der Dementia prae-
cox (Schizophreniegruppe). Allg Z Psychiatr 
Psych Gerichtl Med 1908; 436–464. 
 22 Kronfeld A: Die Psychologie in der Psychia-
trie. Berlin, Springer, 1927. 
 23 Kronfeld A: Das Wesen der psychiatrischen 
Erkenntnis. Berlin, Springer, 1920. 
 24 Kronfeld A: Perspektiven der Seelen-
heilkunde. Leipzig, Thieme, 1930. 
 25 Hoenig J: The concept of schizophrenia – 
Kraepelin-Bleuler-Schneider. Br J Psychiatry 
1983; 142: 547–556. 
 26 Maatz A, Hoff P, Angst J: Eugen Bleuler’s 
schizophrenia – a modern perspective. Dia-
logues Clin Neurosci 2015; 17: 43–49. 
 27 Bleuler E: Dementia praecox oder Gruppe der 
Schizophrenien; in Aschaffenburg G (ed): 
Handbuch der Psychiatrie. Leipzig, Deuticke, 
1911, pp 1–420 (Reprinted Nijmegen, Arts & 
Boeve, 2001). 
 28 Parnas J, Møller P, Kircher T, Thalbitzer J, 
Jansson L, Handest P, Zahavi D: EASE: Ex-
amination of Anomalous Self-Experience. 
Psychopathology 2005; 38: 236–258. 
 29 Scharfetter C: The ego/self experience of 
schizophrenic patients. Schweiz Arch Neurol 
Psychiatr 1985; 146: 200–206. 
 30 Hoff P: Psychische Störungen: erklären, ver-
stehen oder beschreiben? Historische und 
aktuelle Perspektiven einer psychopatholo-
gischen Kernfrage. Schweiz Arch Neurol Psy-
chiatr 2010; 161: 200–208. 
 31 Bleuler E, Jung CG: Komplexe und Krank-
heitsursachen bei Dementia praecox. Zentral-
bl Nervenheilkd Psychiatr 1908: 31: 220–227. 
 32 Bleuler E: Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie. Berlin, 
Springer, 1916. 
 33 Jung CG: Studies in Word-Association. New 
York, Moffat, Yard & Company, 1919. 
 34 Jung CG: The association method. Am J Psy-
chol 1910; 21: 219–269.  
 35 Husserl E: Die Idee der Phänomenologie: 
fünf Vorlesungen, Philosophische Bibliothek. 
Hamburg, Meiner, 1986. 
 36 Husserl E: Zur Phänomenologie des inneren 
Zeitbewusstseins: mit den Texten aus der 
Erstausgabe und dem Nachlass (Neuauflage 
der Studienausgabe von 1985). Philoso-
phische Bibliothek. Hamburg, Meiner, 2013. 
 37 Berrios GE, Marková IS: The self and psychia-
try: a conceptual history; in Kircher T (ed): 
The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2003. 
 38 Bleuler E: Physisch und psychisch in der Pa-
thologie. Z Gesamte Neurol Psychiatr 1916; 
 30: 426–475. 
 39 Cutting J: First rank symptoms of schizophre-
nia: their nature and origin. Hist Psychiatry 
2015; 26: 131–146. 
 40 Nordgaard J, Parnas J: Self-disorders and the 
schizophrenia spectrum: a study of 100 first 
hospital admissions. Schizophr Bull 2014; 40: 
 1300–1307. 
 41 Nelson B, Thompson A, Yung AR: Basic self-
disturbance predicts psychosis onset in the ul-
tra high risk for psychosis “prodromal” popu-
lation. Schizophr Bull 2012; 38: 1277–1287. 
 42 American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5 
Task Force: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders: DSM-5. Arlington, 
APA, 2013. 
 43 Tandon R, Gaebel W, Barch DM, Bustillo J, 
Gur RE, Heckers S, Malaspina D, Owen MJ, 
Schultz S, Tsuang M, Van Os J, Carpenter W: 
Definition and description of schizophrenia 
in the DSM-5. Schizophr Res 2013; 150: 3–10. 
 44 Soares-Weiser K, Maayan N, Bergman H, 
Davenport C, Kirkham AJ, Grabowski S, 
Adams CE: First rank symptoms for schizo-
phrenia. Cochrane Database Syst Rev 2015; 1:
CD010653. 
 45 Blankenburg W: Der Verlust der natürlichen 
Selbstverständlichkeit: ein Beitrag zur Psy-
chopathologie symptomarmer Schizophre-
nien – Beiträge aus der allgemeinen Medizin. 
Stuttgart, Enke, 1971. 
 46 Heinz A, Voss M, Lawrie SM, Mishara A, 
Bauer M, et al: Shall we really say goodbye to 
first rank symptoms? Eur Psychiatry J Assoc 
Eur Psychiatr 2016; 37: 8–13.  
 47 Picardi A, Viroli C, Tarsitani L, Miglio R, Gi-
rolamo G: Heterogeneity and symptom struc-
ture of schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res 2012; 
 198: 386–394. 
 48 Dacquino C, De Rossi P, Spalletta G: Schizo-
phrenia and bipolar disorder: the road from 
similarities and clinical heterogeneity to neu-
robiological types. Clin Chim Acta 2015; 449: 
 49–59. 
 49 Van Os J, Reininghaus U: Psychosis as a trans-
diagnostic and extended phenotype in the 
general population. World Psychiatry 2016; 
 15: 118–124. 
 50 Reininghaus U, Böhnke JR, Hosang G, Farm-
er A, Burns T, McGuffin P, Bentall RP: Evalu-
ation of the validity and utility of a transdiag-
nostic psychosis dimension encompassing 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Br J Psy-
chiatry 2016; 209: 107–113. 
 51 Wigman JTW, de Vos S, Wichers M, Van Os 
J, Bartels-Velthuis AA: A transdiagnostic net-
work approach to psychosis. Schizophr Bull 
2017; 43: 122–132. 
 52 Kretschmer E: Körperbau und Charakter, ed 
1. Berlin, Springer, 1921. 
 53 Rössler W, Ajdacic-Gross V, Haker H, Rod-
gers S, Müller M, Hengartner MP: Subclinical 
psychosis syndromes in the general popula-
tion: results from a large-scale epidemiologi-
cal survey among residents of the canton of 
Zurich, Switzerland. Epidemiol Psychiatr Sci 
2015; 24: 69–77. 
 54 Van Os J: Are psychiatric diagnoses of psy-
chosis scientific and useful? The case of 
schizophrenia. J Ment Health 2010; 19: 305–
317. 
 55 Bleuler E: Freudsche Mechanismen in der 
Symptomatologie von Psychosen. Psychiatr 
Neurol Wochenschr 1906; 34–36: 316–340. 
 56 Mishara AL: Is minimal self preserved in 
schizophrenia? A subcomponents view. Con-
scious Cogn 2007; 16: 715–721. 
 57 Zahavi D: Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investi-
gating the First-Person Perspective. Boston, 
MIT Press, 2005. 
 58 Zahavi D: Schizophrenia and Self-Awareness. 
Philos Psychiat Psychol 2001; 8: 339–341. 
 59 Zahavi D, Kriegel U: For-me-ness: what it is 
and what it is not; in Dahlstrom DO, Elpidrou 
A, Hopp W (eds): Philosophy of Mind and 
Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical 
Approaches. New York, Routledge, 2016, pp 
36–53. 
 60 Hoff P: Arthur Kronfeld und Karl Jaspers; in 
Lammel M, Bormuth M, Sutarski S, Bauer M, 
Lau S (eds): Karl Jaspers’ Allgemeine Psycho-
pathologie – Standortbestimmungen. Berlin, 
Medizinische Wissenschaftliche Verlagsge-
sellschaft, 2017, pp 46–59. 
 61 Fuchs T: Der Begriff der Person in der Psy-
chiatrie. Nervenarzt 2002; 73: 239–246. 
 62 Insel T, Cuthbert B, Garvey M, Heinssen R, 
Pine DS, Quinn K, Sanislow C, Wang P: Re-
search domain criteria (RDoC): toward a new 
classification framework for research on 
mental disorders. Am J Psychiatry 2010; 167: 
 748–751. 
 63 Van Praag HM, Kahn RS, Asnis GM, Wetzler 
S, Brown SL, Bleich A, Korn ML: Denosologi-
zation of biological psychiatry or the specific-
ity of 5-HT disturbances in psychiatric disor-
ders. J Affect Disord 1987; 13: 1–8. 
 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
: 
Un
ive
rs
itä
t Z
ür
ich
,  
E-
M
ed
ie
n 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
13
0.
60
.4
7.
17
8 
- 1
1/
1/
20
19
 1
1:
47
:5
5 
AM
